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This article examines the causes and implications ofthe international debt crisis. It begins
by first defining the debt crisis and offers some basic explanations for the crisis. The
analysis examines the costs ofthe debt crisis and develops some basic explanations for the
crisis. It explores the same conditions in both the North and South countries. Also, the
article addresses the role of international finanCial institutions, and pays some close
attention to the problems ofinternationalfinancial establishments in the 1980s. Finally, it
reviews some general solutions to the debt crisis and provides some tentative suggestions
for future considerations.
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of a "debt crisis" has been almost internationally acknowledged since the
1980s. Some would argue that the crisis had existed unrecognized for many years, despite
alarms sounded regularly over a period of time. The defmition of the crisis in the advanced
industrialized countries was generally the same: the onset of Widespread problems in
servicing the amount of Third World debt threatened the stability of the global financial
establishment. The nightmare in the industrialized capitalist North was an episode of on
rushing financial collapse in the mold of those described so precisely by Kindleberger
(1978) - a default by a major debtor nation (or domino defaults by debtors small and large),
followed by the failure of a major financial institution or institutions, a collapse of
confidence in the financial establishment, and eventually a sharp contraction of economic
activity and global trade (Kindleberger, 1978; Cline, 1983; Stiles & Akaha, 1991). The
reality was that ofa panic; the fear that the financial establishment, which had appeared so
great in dealing with successive shocks in the 1970s, might prove inefficient in the harsher
circumstances of the 1980s.
However, for the less developed countries of the South, the debt crisis was a crisis
ofdevelopment, one element of the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression,
which had begun in some Third World nations after the first oil shock (Stiles & Akaha,
1991). For the less developed countries of the South, the link between debt and economic
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difficulties varied among the regions of the LDCs. For example, in Latin America, which
held the largest share of private debt (and posed the greatest threat to system stability), and
in Eastern Europe the sudden collapse in global lending led to sharp curbs on imports and
severe economic retrenchment, complicated in the case of Eastern Europe by worsening
East-West interaction. Also, Africa's disastrous economic malaise seemed to lie in a sharp
worsening ofit.s terms of trade, a decrease in official development assistance, and damaging
national economic measures. Furthermore, Asia, with the exception of the Philippines, stood
outside the crisis growth rates held up remarkably well, and the region had never entered the
private financial markets with the gusto shown by the Latin American countries.
Meanwhile, some Third World countries made clear their own interest in avoiding further
weakening of the global financial system, the costs to national development objectives were
great for the less developed countries of the South.
This article examines the causes and implications of the international debt crisis.
It begins by first defining the debt crisis and offers some basic explanations for the crisis.
The analysis examines the costs of the debt crisis and develops some basic explanations for
the crisis. It explores the same conditions in both the North and South countries. Also, the
article addresses the role of international fmancial institutions, and pays some close attention
to the possibility of the problems of international financial establishments in the 1980s.
Finally, it reviews some general solutions to the debt crisis and provides some tentative
suggestions for future considerations.
DEFINING THE DEBT CRISIS
Once the Third World country's external debt had increased at rates from 20-30 percent over
a period of ten years, and the levels of external debt had begun to approach 40-50 percent
or more of the national income, an external debt crisis emerges. For our purposes, therefore,
the "debt crisis" will refer to the external debt, both private and public ofdeveloping nations,
which has been growing largely since the early 1970s. Our focus should not obscure,
however, the debt crisis that trouble much of the international economy such as the budget
deficits of the United States, its balance of trade deficits, and the insolvency ofmany of its
savings and loans institutions. These crises are generally interconnected, specifically as they
relate to the issues of interest rates, export values, currency values, and confidence in the
global banking system. The "debt crisis," therefore, is an international phenomenon, and
any effort to understand it accurately needs an international perspective. However, the
greatest suffering henceforth in the crisis is found within the less developed countries, and
therein lies the justification of our focus. Again, within the LDCs, the attention can be
directed toward a variety of problems depending on how one chooses to think about the
debt. As Ferraro and Rosser put it (1994, p. 333):
One can focus on the integrity of the international fmancial system, in which case
one's emphasis is on the countries with the largest debts, such as Mexico or Brazil.
Alternatively, a primary concern can be on the desperate human costs of the debt, which
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would direct attention to Sub-Saharan Africa, for example. Yet another perspective, the
strategic dimension of the problem, would concentrate on debtors such as Turkey or South
Korea.
Attention will be paid primarily to what have been termed the most heavily
indebted countries within the Third World nations. This focus is not neutral, since it
generally refers to those countries with the largest debts and whose threat ofdefault shows
a serious concern to lending institutions (World Bank, 1989). The bias of the focus,
however, should not divert attention from the smaller nations, specifically those in Africa,
whose debts are crushingly large to their people, even though the banks and global lending
institutions consider them less significant (IMF, 1992).
The increasing rate of debt for the most heavily indebted countries is evident. In
1970, the fifteen heavily indebted countries (utilizing the World Bank grouping of 1989) had
an external public debt of $17,923 billion - which amounted to 9.8 percent of their gross
national product. By 1987, these same countries owed $402,172 billion, or 47.6 percent of
their gross national product (Frieden & Lake, 1991; Anderson, 1990; Klare & Thomas,
1994; Mosssberg, 1989; Kilbourn, 1989; IMF, 1989). Also, interest payments owned by
these nations increased from $2,789 billion in 1970 to $36,252 billion in 1987.
While debt service, defined as the sum of actual repayments of principal and actual
payments of interest made in foreign currencies, goods or services on external public and
publicly owned debt, amounted to 1.5 percent of their gross national product and 12.5
percent of their total exports of goods and services in 1970. Meanwhile, in 1987, those
figures had increased to 4.5 percent and 24.9 percent respectively (Frieden & Lake, 1991,
p.318). Table 1 on the following page provides the statistical data using the World Bank's
1992 classification ofheavily indebted nations. For the Third World as a whole, in 1991,
the total external debt was $1.362 trillion, which was 126.5 percent of its total exports of
goods and services in that year, and the debt servicing ratio to the gross domestic product
ofthe Third World amounted to 32.4 percent (Cline, 1983, p. 31).
Meanwhile, the external debt of the less developed countries could not continue to
increase at rates largely above the rate ofgrowth of their gross national product indefmitely.
Whenever the debt accelerated more sharply than income, the ratio of debt to income
increased. As long as the debt's rate ofgrowth was greater than its interest rate, the Third
World countries incurred no current costs by issuing more new debt abroad, since the
foreign exchange received from the sale of the new debt was more than enough to pay for
the interest on the outstanding debt. On the other side of the game, if the creditors became
convinced that the ratio of debt to income could not continue to accelerate at this rate, their
credit rationing would become very difficult, the rate at which the debt increased would slow
down, and the less developed countries would find themselves increasingly less able to
promote new loans with which to pay the interest on the outstanding debt. This occurence
would force the borrowers to make some necessary adjustment. In fact, the degree of
adjustment would vary according to the borrower's willingness to pay interest on a
scheduled basis, and according to the lender's willingness to purchase new loans from the
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borrowers at a minimum rate. However, it is important to note that both the timing of the
external debt crisis and its severity were influenced by (i) the increase in nominal rates on
securities denominated in the United States dollar and (ii) by the global recession. In this
situation, higher nominal interest rates meant larger interest payments by the borrowers on
the floating interest rates element of their external debt. While recession on the other hand,
meant their export earnings decreased. The external debt crisis is specifically associated
with the surge in interest rates on this debt, which decreased the net cash inflow associated
with a given volume of debt sales. The main consequence came from decreased net cash
inflows produced by the declined capacity to sell new loans.
TABLE 1
























































































Source: The World Development Report, 1992 (Washington, D.C: The World Bank).
Tables 21 and 24, pp. 258-265.
73
4
African Social Science Review, Vol. 1 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol1/iss1/6
African Social Science Review
THE SOURCES AND EVOLUTION OF THE DEBT CRISIS
External debt of the less developed countries is always tied to increases in the price of
energy, as established by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
beginning 1973-1974. From that period the surpluses generated by the OPEC countries
became linked to the deficits of the energy importing LDCs in a recycling process initiated
and managed by the major international banks. Two concurrent relationships emerged. On
the demand side, petroleum importing countries paid higher prices for their oil imports, for
which some preferred to borrow the additional foreign exchange needed rather than to make
serious economic adjustments at horne. On the supply side, OPEC countries decided to
deposit a large amount of their newly acquired surplus values (profit) with the major
international banks. Therefore, the latter used these deposits as loans to the less developed
countries. Two major observations confirm to the reality of this statement. On an annual
standpoint, external loans of oil-importing Third World nations increased at a greater rate
than their oil-import records. This does not happen to oil exporting nations (such as Peru,
Mexico, Ecuador, or Venezuela), whose oil exporting receipt increased along with their
external indebtedness. In reality, the oil-import records of these nations did not rise. The
true story explaining the relative increase in external loans of both oil-importing and oil-
exporting nations is that the international commercial leaders were relaxing their credit
rationing standards to encourage more borrowing.
The conventional orthodox explanation is that the debt crisis of the 1980s was due
to a number of highly contingent conditions that were significantly unpredictable at the time
many of these loans were made. William Cline of the Institute for International Economics
identified the causes of the debt crisis in this fashion:
The external debt crisis that emerged in many developing countries in
1982 can be traced to higher oil prices in 1973-74 and 1979-80, high
interest rates in 1980-82, declining export prices and volume associated
with global recession in 1981-82, problems of domestic economic
management, and an adverse psychological shift in the credit markets
(Cline, 1983, p. 31).
This condition really started earlier than 1973 because debt has been solidly
entrenched in the finances of the Third World nations for many years. The United States
was a heavily indebted nation in the 20th century, and poorer nations have always needed
outside infusions of investment capital in order to develop their resources. The logic of
indebtedness is very simple. For instance, a nation incurs a debt in hopes of making an
investment that will produce enough money both to payoff the debt and to generate
economic growth that is self-sustaining. An essential feature of the Third World debt before
1973 was that it was generally financed through public institutions, both bilateral and
multilateral. These institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
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mainly guided the investments toward programs that held out genuine promise ofeconomic
stability, viability, growth, and prosperity.
Hence, after the oil crisis of 1973-1974, many international financial
establishments found themselves awash with "petrodollar" from some petroleum exporting
countries, and these private international financial establishments were anxious to put this
windfall capital to productive use. These international financial establishments believed that
sovereign debt was a good risk since there was a prevalent hope that nations would not
default (United Nations Chronicle, 1990). Also, many less developed countries, suffering
from oil price increase, were further anxious to receive these loans. At this point, however,
the LDCs argued that loans were the right way to ease the trauma of the oil price increases
specifically given the very high inflation rates at the period. Meanwhile, other LDCs, in the
oil producing nations (Mexico, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Venezuela, Colombia, and the like), saw
the loan as a means to capitalize on their much-improved financial status, and they believed
that oil prices would remain high in real terms for a given period of time. In fact, it is very
simple to prove that these actions did not conform to the true logic of indebtedness. For one
thing, these loans were being used to pay for current consumption, not for productive
investments. The loan was not being used to mobilize underutilized resources, but rather to
maintain a current, albeit desperate, standard ofliving. Furthermore, these loans were being
made in an unstable economic and political environment. Since the untraveling of the
Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, international economic relations had been steadily
worsening. Since that time the LDCs began to experience a long term, secular decrease in
demand for their goods as the industrialized capitalist countries tightened their economic
belts in order to pay for oil price increase.
The proof of the wrongheadedness of the lending in the 1970s became, seriously
apparent in 1981. During that time, interest rate increased, and international demand for
exports from the LDCs declined seriously. Moreover, the world recession of 1981-1982
made it impossible for the LDCs to generate enough income to pay back their loans on
schedule. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), products' prices (for goods such as foodstuffs, fuels, minerals, etc.) dropped 28
percent in 1981-1982, and between 1980 and 1982, and between 1980 and 1982 interest
payments on loans increased by 50 percent in nominal terms and 75 percent in real terms
(UN Children's Emergency Fund, 1992; IMF, 1992; Adepoju, 1993; Onimode, 1989; World
Bank, 1989). At the same time, in 1982, Mexico came to the brink of what everyone had
thought impossible just two years earlier-default (Winikoff, 1990). This critical condition
marked the beginning of what is conventionally termed "the debt crisis." At the same time
private commercial banks quickly disengaged from further lending because the risks are too
great. Also, in order to prevent a panic which might have had the impact on untraveling the
entire global financial establishment, a number of governmental and nongovernmental
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POVERTY AS AN EXPLANATORY MODEL FOR THE DEBT CRISIS
As we perceive it, the macroeconomic debts of the Third World will not be completely
repaid. This is very true because the people who live in these regions cannot afford to repay
them. For one thing, the harsh reality of poverty in the poorer of the poor nations was an
initial stimulus for the borrowings. Economic situation suggested that borrowing money was
a reasonable course ofaction in the 1970s, specifically for poorer countries, which saw few,
if any, alternative ways to address the economic problem of their people. Those who live
in the wealthy nations of the industrialized capitalist countries can really witness profound
poverty. For many ofthem do not have equal access to education, good nutrition, housing,
health care and the like. The truth that these deprivations exist alongside enormous wealth
is shocking, but they pale when compared to the scale of international poverty. The
homelessness, illness, hunger, and suffering of the poor in the advanced capitalist
industrialized nations must be multiplied a thousand times, in some situations a million times
to begin to reflect the scope of poverty in the world's poorest countries. For example, in
the 1980s, the average per capita income for citizens living in the poor nations in the South
was 8 percent of the income in the industrialized capitalist countries of the North. In Africa,
more than one-fifth ofthe population lives below the poverty line, with those in Sub-Saharan
Africa bearing the heaviest burden (Ferraro & Rosser, 1994, p. 336). Also, a child in the
Third World suffers a risk ofdeath five to twelve times greater than that ofa child in North
America or Western Europe. A pregnant woman in Africa, Asia, or Latin America is 50 or
100 times more likely to die in childbirth than women in the rich, advanced countries
(United Nations Children's Emergency Fund, 1992).
Apart from the availability of statistical data and indicators, international poverty
is as hard to measure as it is to conceptualize. Meanwhile, it is easy to characterize
abstractly the living conditions of the world's impoverished population, but, there is no
generally accepted method of identifying the poor, and hence, ofmeasuring the exact degree
of international poverty. For this reason, economists, politicians, social scientists, agencies
for international aid, and historians each advocates their own specific definition ofpoverty
depending upon the interest, whether noble or self serving, which they are protecting.
However, whatever the bias of these scholars or the method used to estimate the number of
international poverty, the statistics are overwhelmingly high, sometimes beyond expectation
as these estimates provided by the United Nations Chronicle indicated.
The major debate concerning the definition of poverty centers around the two
common types of measurements: income model and basic need model. According to
income model, the most common measure of poverty, believes that poverty is a direct
function of income and individual purchasing power within countries. This model argues
that individuals with a higher income should have greater access to goods and services that
will satisfy their basic needs (all things being equal). According to income model, the
countries with a higher gross national product (GNP) and GNP per capita generally will have
a greatly higher standard of living for all their citizens. Thus, the income model approach
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utilizes a cross-national comparison of gross national product, gross national product per
capita, and gross domestic product (GDP) statistics to define poverty. As a result ofthis, in
1990, the World Bank's defmition of poverty was all of the world's population living on less
than $370 per annum; a figure obtained from the average of the poverty lines of the poorest
countries in the world. By this method, more than 20 percent of the world's population live
in poverty.
Meanwhile, the degree with which gross national product and related economic
indicators can be calculated, and the capability to set an actual "poverty line" based on these
"hard" figures, are the general characteristics of the income model approach. This model
has many hidden and general weaknesses. First, in spite the fairly accurate nature of the
income definition of poverty, it is, in reality, based on averages. For example, the gross
national product per capita indicator measures the average income of each individual in a
country by dividing the total gross national product by the total population. This is one of
the poor economic indicators in the real world situation because it does not consider the
unequal distribution of wealth and income within the country.
In contrast, the basic needs model defines and conceptualizes poverty differently.
According to the basic needs model, it is not a lack of money-that causes people to live
impoverished lives, it is a lack of food, shelter, education, safe drinking water, health care,
and sanitation. For these reasons, the model establishes a minimum standard for each of
these life-sustaining factors and classifies as poor those who in the final analysis have access
to less than a minimum requirement. The classification of the impoverished, according to
the basic needs model approach, is one who is illiterate, short-lived, malnourished, sickly,
and lacking adequate sanitation and shelter. The poorest countries, as classified by a basic
needs model are those who do not provide for the basic needs of their citizens. Essentially,
they are not always the countries with the lowest gross national product. For instance, Sri
Lanka is grouped 120th in the world per capita gross national product, but is listed as 75th
in the United Nations' 1990 Human Development Report (Todaro, 1989; Pool & Stamos,
1987; Dietz, 1986).
Despite the fact that the basic needs model demonstrates the living conditions of
the world's poorest people far better than a simple income model approach, it also has its
own weaknesses as an approach for measuring the level ofpoverty in the World. First, the
data for the basic needs model is really difficult to collect. A successful study of the basic
needs model is time-consuming and expensive. Thus, basic needs model approach
sometimes relies upon rough estimates and averages and even some income related
information. Moreover, the classifications of basic needs and their importance relative to
one another are purely subjective.
Establishing a corrective approach of calculating international poverty is much
more than a matter of precision. According to Ferraro and Rosser (1994), the way one
defines poverty has a great influence on the types of measure that are chosen to control it.
For example, those scholars who use income model perceive economic growth as an
ultimate solution to world poverty. This model ofanalysis depends largely on the theory of
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"trickle down economics," that is, any increase in the productivity and relative wealth ofa
country will in the long-run trickle down to benefit every sector of the economy and, hence,
each family unit and individual. Therefore, the World Bank, for example, adopts economic
recovery and structural programs to help poor countries increase the rate ofgrowth in their
gross national products, and primarily improve the standards of living in their economy.
However, those scholars who favor and encourage the basic needs model do not believe that
national economic growth is enough to eliminate world poverty, and instead, emphasize
questions of how that growth is distributed within a nation. They claim that few of the
benefits of increased productivity ever reach the most vulnerable group in low-income
nations, and, hence, encourage policies that directly target the poor. Such programs include
vaccination and health outreach services, campaigns against illiteracy, nutritional
supplements, infant and matemal mortality and the like.
Despite the method of analysis, it is generally evident that many people in the
world are living lives of wretched deprivation. This is particularly true for children and
women in the Third World. Women and children are the most vulnerable groups of any
given country, but they are the main victims of poverty. Women as a group, in poor
countries, regardless ofage, receive less health care, less food, and less education than men.
In the Third World nations today, the female literacy is three quarters that of the male.
Also, women work, on average, twice as many hours, including according to Ferraro and
Rosser (1994), the unpaid labor of domestic farming, gathering, and caring for the young,
the old, and the sick. Again, because ofhard labor conditions, inefficient professional health
care, poorer nutrition, and unsanitary living standards, women in the less developed world
account for 99 percent of maternal deaths around the world (Todaro, 1989). The health of
children is even worse. Every seven seconds, a child dies and another disabled by a disease
for which there is already an effective, if not efficient preventive measure. Therefore, these
are the main conditions that force countries to borrow in the first place. The reality of the
debt crisis is that this borrowing only made the suffering even worse. For the developing
world to address these economic and social problems, they have to encourage more private
foreign investment, borrowing, and/or seeking more public foreign assistance.
Unfortunately, neither private foreign investment nor a large proportion offoreign aid comes
in the form of gifts (that is outright grants). The receipt of loan assistance implies the
necessity of future repayments of principal amount and interest.
FROM DEVELOPMENT TO LDCs DEBT CRISIS
The accumulation ofexternal debt is general phenomena of the less developed countries at
the stage of economic development where the supply of domestic savings are very low,
current account payments deficits are generally high, and imports of capital are essentially
needed to augment domestic or local resources (Anunobi, 1992; Harris, 1986; Klare &
Thomas, 1994; Todaro, 1989; Adepoju, 1993; Thasan, 1981). Prior to the 1970s, the
external debt of the LDCs was extremely low, and the majority of creditors being foreign
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govemments and international financial establishments such as the International Monetary
Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (popularly known as the
World Bank), and regional development banks. The majority of these loans were generally
on concessional (that is, low interest) terms and were extended for purposes of adopting
development measures and increasing imports ofcapital goods. Meanwhile, during the late
1970s and early 1980s, commercial banks started playing a greater role in global lending by
recycling supply of OPEC "petrodollars" and providing general-purpose loans to the Third
world countries to ensure balance of payments support and expansion ofexport sectors. As
international borrowing can be greatly advantageous - providing the resources necessary to
accelerate economic growth and development - it has its own consequences. At this time,
these consequences have generally outweighed the advantages for many less developed
countries. One of the major consequences associated with the accumulation of a high
external debt is "debt servicing." Debt servicing is the payment of amortization (that is the
liquidation of the principal) and accumulated interest. Specifically, it is a contractually fixed
charge on local real income and savings. Therefore, as the size of interest rates grow, debt-
service charges increase. In this case, however, debt-service payments must be made with
foreign exchange. To put it differently, debt-service obligations can be accomplished only
through export receipts, reduced imports, and further external borrowing. All things being
equal, most ofa nation's debt-service obligations are solved by its export receipts.
Again, before entering into the statistical analyses and tracing the evolutions of the
Third World debt crisis, it is important to know the meaning of the term ''basic transfer."
The basic transfer of a country defined by Todaro(I989) is the net foreign exchange inflow
(or outflow) related to its global borrowing. It is measured as the difference between the net
capital inflow and interest payments on the existing accumulated debt. Also, the net capital
inflow then is simply the difference between the gross inflow and the amortization on past
debt (Horsefield, 1969; Anunobi, 1992; Kaldor, 1982; Thasa, 1981). The reason why the
basic transfer is such an essential concept according to Todaro, is that it signifies the amount
of foreign exchange that a particular Third World nation is gaining or losing each year from
global capital flows. Available evidence shows that the basic transfer of the LDCs turned
very negative during the 1980s, causing a loss of foreign exchange and a net outflow of
capital. The basic transfer equation explains the situation very well. At this point, the basic
transfer equation can be expressed in this way. Let the net capital inflow, Xk, be
represented as the rate of increase of total debt and let (A) signify the total accumulated
foreign debt. Hence if (a) is the percentage rate of increase in that total debt, then
Xk=axA
Therefore, because interest must be paid each year on the accumulated debt, let us let i
represent the average rate of interest so that i x A measures total annual interest payments.
Then, the "basic transfer" (BT) is therefore the net capital inflow minus interest payments
79
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or
BT = a x A - i x A = (a-i)A
BT will be positive only if a is greater than i and the nation will be gaining foreign
exchange. Meanwhile if i is greater than a, the basic transfer automatically turns negative
and the country loses foreign exchange. The analysis of the origins of and prospects for the
LDCs debt crisis requires an examination of those variables that cause a and i to either
increase or decrease.
During the early period of debt accumulation when a Third World nation has a
relatively small total debt, (A), the rate of increase, (a), is likely to be high. Again, since the
majority of the first stage debt accumulation comes from official rather than private sources
in the form of bilateral foreign assistance and World Bank providing, most of the debt is
incurred on concessional terms - that is, at below - market interest rates with lengthy
repayment periods. Hence, (i) is generally low and, in any circumstance, less than (a).
Also, because this accumulating debt is being utilized for productive development programs
with rates of return greater than (i), then the additional foreign exchange and increasing
international debt represented by the positive basic transfers pose no problems for the debtor
countries. In reality, this process ofdebt accumulation for productive investments represents
a significant ingredient in any viable strategy oflong-run growth and development. A major
concern emerges, however, when (I) the accumulated debt becomes generally high so that
its rate of increase, (a), gradually starts to decrease as amortization increases relative to rates
of new gross inflows; (2) the sources of international capital change from long-term,
"official flows" on fixed concessionalloans to short-term private commercial bank loans at
market rates that cause (i) to increase; (3) when this happens, the recipient nation starts to
experience serious balance of payments problems as product prices deteriorate and the terms
oftrade decline; (4) an increase in U.S. interest rates on which variable-rate of private bank
loans are measured, or an unexpected change in the value of the U.S. dollar in which most
LDCs loans are denominated or a world recession or some other external shock like an
increase in oil price; (v) a loss in confidence in Third World countries' ability to repay their
loans resulting in (2), (3), and (4) to happen, thus forcing private foreign banks to cut off
their flow of new lending. Sometimes, however, essentially a large flight of capital is
enhanced by local citizens who for economic or political reasons (for instance, expectations
of future currency devaluation) begin to transfer large sums of money out of the country to
be invested in various advanced industrialized countries. Any of the above mentioned
variables can reduce the value of (a) and cause the value of (i) to rise in the basic transfer
equation. Also, all of the above factors can combine to lower (a), and raise (i), in the basic
transfer equation with the net result that the whole basic transfer becomes generally negative
and capital flows from the less developed to the developed world. Having given this
analytical and conceptual background, attention can now be turned onto the macroeconomic
stabilization measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund to address the Third
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World economic and debt crisis.
THE IMF AS A GUARANTOR OF THE LDCs CREDITWORTHINESS
During the 1970s and 1980s, the primary and most active role of the International Monetary
Fund has become lending to the less developed countries experiencing shortages of foreign
exchange, and as part of this, prescribing economic measures for them. Within the general
development, the les$ developed countries have become one of the Fund's major issues.
Between 1973-1979 the increase in LDCs' borrowing occurred primarily under special credit
lines designed to finance balance of payments deficits due largely to increased oil prices,
temporary short falls in export earnings or to provide "soft credit" from the proceeds of the
IMF's sales of gold. However, after 1980, the majority of the LDCs have become major
borrowers under the regular system for borrowing under "stand by" or "extended"
agreements which are tied to prescriptions and conditions on the borrowing country's
actions. (Thasan, 1981). For example, of the total amount of the IMF credit committed to
all nations under such agreements, African states accounted for 30 percent in 1979 and 1980
whereas they accounted for only 3 percent over 1970 to 1978 (Anunobi, 1992; Gardner,
1980; Godfrey, 1983; Adepoju, 1994). The IMF attaches strong conditions to the loans it
provides a member nation beyond that country's first tranche' of credit or some special kinds
ofloans. Hence, in upper tranche' borrowing, conditions attach to the stand-by arrangements
the IMF makes with a borrower; as the name implies these stand-by agreements, once
agreed, permit the IMF to "stand-by" to provide credit up to specified limits over a specified
time (one year was formerly the norm ) as long as the borrower satisfied specified
conditions. Similar if not the same conditions apply to funds provided under the IMF's
Extended Fund Facility. However, the imposition of such conditionalities has not always
been part of the IMF's practice. The policy was established in its first decades and has been
modified at intervals (Killick, 1982). Systematic information on the conditions imposed is
not available, for the general details of each nation's agreement are secret. MeaAwhile,
information about the conditions some borrowing nations have faced has been publicized
by non-IMF sources (Anunobi, 1992). The Fund's own statement on the character of these
conditions give a clear indication of the IMF's official rationale for creating them and, thus,
of its rationale for its own role in relation to borrowing countries.
As the case may be, the names the IMF gives to the packages of conditionalities it
attaches to a loan are "stabilization policy" and "structural adjustment policy" which show
the Fund's underlying conception that its role is to assist borrowers to return to some norms.
The member country needs funds because of some temporary disequilibrium from a normal
position, or some imbalances to which it must adjust. Stability needs to be restored and,
once this is achieved, the Fund credit and conditionalities will no longer be needed.
However, the conception has been modified in the 1980s for in the intractable crises that the
increasing members of the Third World borrowers seemed to face, it was perceived that a
return to a stable condition may call for a succession ofadjustment policies supported by the
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IMF (Zulu & Nsouli, 1984). Meanwhile, this concept does not indicate what is to be
stabilized. The brain behind the Fund at its creation was that stability in member states'
balance ofpayments was the objective to be accomplished under the Bretton Woods system
of fixed but adjustable exchange rates.
Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund's statements of the objects of
stabilization programs treat them as a hierarchy with some objectives being only means to
an end, but the primary end has varied over time. Stabilization of the balance of payments
has, at times, been replaced in public statements by the aim ofaccomplishing stable growth
with targets such as control of credit expansion, stable price level, and balance of payments
stability itself presented as means to that end. As Harris (1994) argues:
While the Fund provided resources to support appropriate adjustment
programs, a primary concern of the African countries that adopted such
programs was the achievement ofa sustainable level ofeconomic growth.
However, the key to such sustainability was the establishment of
domestic and external financial stability. Accordingly, in the general
design of these programs, the three basic and interdependent objectives
were to promote economic growth, to reduce inflation, and to improve the
current account position ofthe balance ofpayment over the medium term.
.. Considerable emphasis was given to economic growth in the programs
under consideration; most aimed for an increase in economic growth
during the program year (quoted in Klare & Thomas, 1994, pp. 341-342).
The IMF policies, by emphasizing the re-establishment of domestic and external
financial stability, can contribute to putting a nation on a sustainable growth area (Klare &
Thomas, 1994). Unfortunately, the IMF does not always present growth as the primary
target. Therefore, the inconsistency between pronouncements giving preference to growth
and those which put the balance of payments first reflects more than a conflict between two
interest groups.
Also, the policy measures are attached as conditions to formal stabilization and
structural adjustment loans aimed at overcoming short-term imbalances. This includes
contractionary policies to achieve short-term stabilization and restore equilibrium in the
balance-of-payments through expenditure-switching measures designed to reduce the level
of aggregate demand. Sometimes this meant decreasing budgetary deficits, relating prices
to market levels, liberalizing trade, adjusting exchange rates (exclusively through
devaluation oflocal currency), and controlling the supply ofmoney and credit system. In
most instances, specific targets and time limits were set for major macroeconomic indicators.
Furthermore, these economic measures aimed at institutional reform, include public
enterprises and parastatals. These macroeconomic stabilization measures gave preference
to private sector enterprises over those in the public sector and used market-determined
prices to influence production and consumption patterns. These economic stabilization
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policies likewise favored export promotion, reinforcing the orientation of Third World
economies toward uncertain external markets. In reality, these programs assumed that the
economic crises afflicting the economies of the LDCs flowed from domestic policy short
comings. If extemal variables were taken into consideration at all, they were seen as mainly
conjunctural.
Conversely, policies of structural adjustment are designed to address balance of
payments imbalances that are generally internally generated by high inflation rates, huge
budget deficits, or structural impediments to the efficient allocation of resources, such as
subsidies or tariffs. The Fund structural adjustment policies highlight "productive capacity
as critical to economic performance" and emphasize "policies to increase the economy's
productivity capability and to raise the flexibility of factor and products markets" (Klare &
Thomas, 1994, pp. 341-343; see also Wilber & Jameson, 1992; Mansbacb, 1994; Ray,
1993). A basic assumption in a structural adjustment policy is that current consumption
must be suppressed so that capital can be diverted into more productive domestic
investments. A similar assumption of the Fund macroeconomic measure is that exposure
to international competition in investment and trade can accelerate the efficiency ofdomestic
production. .In reality, these policy measures involve reduced food and transportation
subsidies, curbs on government expenditure, public sector layoffs, and higher interest and
tax rates. These results typically affect the poorest members of the economy more than any
one else. However, when we are dealing with a specifically inefficient economic system,
structural adjustment becomes perhaps the most acceptable prescription. For one thing,
there were many instances ofgross inefficiency, not to mention outright corruption in many
of these nations that were soliciting International Monetary Fund assistance. In this
circumstance, the IMF programs were probably regarded as the correct approach by the
private and public financial institutions that were being asked to reschedule loans.
Meanwhile, the critical difference between the traditional Fund role and its new role as
guarantor ofcredit worthiness is that the suppression ofdemand, previously designed to free
capital for domestic investment, simply freed capital to leave the economy.
Furthermore, IMF argues that it was primarily inefficient economic management
in the LDCs that led to the debt crisis in the first place. As a result of this, the LDCs had
gorged themselves on easy money in the 1970s, with the debt crisis being mainly equivalent
ofa fiscal and psychological hand over. With that in mind, the Fund argued that the failures
of stabilization policies or structural adjustment measures were due largely to political
constraints or weak administrative systems, as opposed to external variables that were
beyond the control of the LDCs. It is very difficult to determine the validity of this view.
For one reason, some loans have been misused. That notwithstanding, the LDCs cannot be
blamed on fiscal irresponsibility in such issues as the increase in interest rates or the World
recession in 1981-1982. In the overall analysis, blame rests on a system of finance that
permitted the LDCs and financial institutions to engage in transactions only reasonable in
the context of wildly optimistic scenarios of economic growth. Additionally, much blame
rests on public policy measures in the United States that were undertaken with insufficient
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regard for their global fmancial implications.
To be sure, the failure ofconventional strategies to alleviate the debt crisis suggests
that perhaps the conventional orthodox interpretation of the debt crisis is inadequate if not
misleading. The most compelling evidence is the fact that periodic debt crisis seem to be
endemic to the contemporary global system. There have been cycles ofdebt and default in
the past, and some of the same debtors have experienced similar crises in all circumstances.
Hence, the debt crisis of the 1980s cannot be contemplated mainly to the contingent
conditions of oil price increase in 1973-1974 and the United States fiscal and monetary
policy as the orthodox conventional theorists portray these factors. Whatever explanation
they have must be supplemented by variables and/or factors that are more structural in
nature. Indeed, there are two major concerns relatively unexplored by the traditional
conventional interpretation of the debt crisis that need much attention, and they both relate
to the vulnerability of the LDCs to changes in the international economy over which they
have little or no control: their dependence on primary products as sources of their export
revenues and their sensitivity to monetary changes in the developed market economies. The
last consideration is perhaps more serious.
It is not a mere coincidence that the United States experienced its own very serious
debt crisis in the same year that concern arose among the heavily indebted countries. The
large government debt of the U.S. and its related balance of trade deficits precipitated a
deliberate measure of economic contraction that had international implications. For
example, interest rates in the U.S. had accomplished very high levels in 1979, but the
inflation rates at the time were also very high. Also, after the deep economic recession of
1981-1982, the inflation rate decreased dramatically, but the interest rates remained
excessively high. To put it in the words of Klare and Thomas (1994, p. 343):
Interest rates remained high because they were necessary to attract foreign
investments to finance the extraordinary U.S. budget deficits created by
the reductions pushed by the Reagan administration and passed by the
Congress. In turn, the high interest rates inflated the value of dollar,
reducing U.S. demand for developing-country exports and further
diminishing the ability of the indebted countries to repay their loans.
However, the United States did not experience a debt "crisis" simply because it was
unable to reassure its creditors that its promises to pay were obvious. But the high real
interest rates forced upon the less developed states as their loans were turned over created
a condition where no similar guarantees could be provided. Since it is a reality that the
LDCs could no longer meet the increased payments, the private financial establishments
tried to pull back, bringing about the very crisis they planned to solve. Only very persistent
efforts by official governmental agencies managed to stabilize the condition enough to avoid
a repeated default. In fact, it was the activities and actions of the U.S. that created the
immediate crisis, and not some circumstances or pattern ofcircumstances in the Third World
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itself.
Truly, the debt crisis exacerbated an already bad condition with respect to the
capability of the LDCs to pay back their loans. The majority of the LDCs were generally
poor prior to the debt crisis, which was one ofthe main reasons why they looked for external
sources of funding. There was no strong indication before 1973, that this situation of
relative poverty was improving in any but a few of the LDCs, such as ,the newly
industrializing states of Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. In reality, most Third World
nations were falling further behind the advanced capitalist industrialized states at an
alarming rate. The less developed countries will always remain relatively poorer than the
developed capitalist countries as long as they rely strongly on primary or raw materials, such
as cocoa, rubber, groundnut, and copper for export earnings. Trade may be a stimulus to
growth or development, but trade is not an effective mechanism to overcome relative
poverty if and when the values for primary products fail to keep pace with the value of
manufactured commodities. The relationship between the values of manufactured exports
and the values of primary goods exports (the terms of trade) has been carefully examined
by many economists, and some of them, such as Raul Prebisch, have believed that the global
division of labor is systematically biased against the interests of states that depend strongly
on the export of primary goods. This debate, which has been extended into what has beel}
designated a theory of dependency, is a difficult one to resolve with clear empirical
evidence.
Contemporary evidence, however, suggests that producers of raw materials have
really suffered relative economic losses in the 20th century. With regard to this, Grilli and
Yang (1988) have analyzed the terms of trade between primary products exports and
manufactured products exports since 1900 and discovered that the prices of all primary
products (including fuels or minerals) relative to those traded manufactures decreased by
more than 36 percent over 1900-1986 period, at an average annual rate of 0.5 percent
(United Nations, 1988). Hence, the Third World nations are at a structural disadvantage
compared to the advanced capitalist countries. The newly industrialized states of East Asia
are exceptions to this rule; because they have been able to expand manufactured exports
beyond reasonable expectation. They have as well improved their relative economic and
financial condition more than expected in recent time. Other LDCs have been less
successful, and the current resurgence ofprotectionist measures against manufactured goods
from the LDCs will make this type of transition even worse. Therefore, the solution to the
debt crisis, and the underlying poverty that engendered it must address these concerns.
THE COSTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBT CRISIS
Among debt-affected Third World nations, the 1980s debt created a devastating crisis. The
hostility and trauma caused by the debt crisis that first emerged in August 1982 are difficult
to mention. The evolution of debt has had many implications for the less developed
countries, but this particular section will exclusively focus on three specific effects: the fall
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in the quality of life within debtor nations, the political crisis associated with that fall, and
the consequences of the decline on the advanced capitalist nations (Anderson, 1990). The
first, and most devastating, consequence of the debt crisis was, and continues to be the
important movement ofcapital from the LDCs to finance the debt. According to the World
Bank, before 1982, the highly indebted countries received about 2 percent ofgross national
product (GNP) a year in resources from overseas; since then they have transferred about 3
percent of GNP a year in the opposite direction (Anunobi, 1992). Also, in 1988 the LDCs
transferred $50 billion to the advanced industrial societies, and the cumulative total of these
transfers since 1984 is approximately $120 billion (Hastedt & Knickrehm, 1991, pp. 361-
367).
The issue became so pervasive that even institutions whose responsibilities
included helping the indebted nations were draining capital from the LDCs. For example,
in 1987 the International Monetary Fund received nearly 8.6 billion more in loan repayments
and interest charges that it lent out (Ibid.).
However, this capital movement has definitely prevented prospect for economic
growth or development in the less developed countries and seriously skewed the patterns of
economic development in the first place. The real consequences for growth are summarized
in Table 2. The decrease in average growth, from 6.3 percent a year to 1.7 percent a year,
is even worse than it seems. With the rate of population increases in these nations, a 1.7
percent rise in GDP translates into a net fall in per capita GDP. To put it differently, the
populations of these nations were essentially worse off economically during the period of
the debt crisis; and this fall further jeopardized opportunities for future economic
development given its consequences on local demand and productive investment. According
to Prebisch, the terms of trade statistics, which reflect the relative movement of export
revenues to import prices, are similarly grim: The LDCs are receiving less in return for the
exported commodities when generally compared to their costs for imported products. In
reality, these countries must export even more of their primary products in order to maintain
current levels of imported manufactured goods.
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TABLE 2
Effects of External Debt on Economic Growth and Trade
Gross Domestic Terms of Trade
Product Average (1987=100)
Yearly Growth
1990-80 1980-90 1980 1990
Algeria ** 3.1 174 99
Argentina 3.4 -0.4 110 112
Bolivia 4.4 -0.1 167 97
Brazil 9.0 2.7 92 123
Bulgaria ** 2.6 ** **
Congo 6.2 3.6 145 99
Cote d'Ivoire 6.8 0.5 110 80
Ecuador 8.8 2.0 153 109
Mexico 6.5 1.0 133 110
Morocco 5.7 4.0 88 86
Nicaragua 2.5 -2.2 111 110
Peru 3.9 -0.3 III 78
Poland ** 1.8 94 103
Syria 9.1 2.1 125 87
Venezuela 3.7 l.l 174 164
Average 6.3 1.7 118 101
Source: The World Development Report, 1992 (Washington, D.C: The World Bank).
Tables 2 and 14, pp. 244-245.
As it stands now, the debt crisis has a self-reinforcing dynamic. Economically and
politically, the implications of the debt crisis have been profounded. Twenty-eight Latin
American and Carribbean countries that have undergone economic stabilization programs
or structural measures as a consequence of debt were able to finance $145 billion in debt
payments between 1982 and 1988 but still face economic stagnation, increasing
unemployment, and a 7 percent fall in per capita income (World Bank, 1989, p. 191; IMF,
1991). Real wages decreased in Latin American countries including Mexico by 50 percent
during this period. The rise in debt service and the deterioration in lending to LDCs have
resulted in net resource transfers from the LDCs to the developed countries. This has
prevented domestic capital formation in most LDCs, and it also resulted in a drain on
valuable foreign exchange earnings. A net resource transfer is the amount of external loans
made minus the amount of interest and amortization payments being made on external debt.
This amounts to a transfer of wealth in real terms. Also, between 1977 and 1982, the Third
World nations received a positive resource transfer of$147 billion. Since then there have
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been negative transfers of$85 billion (World bank, 1989, p. 191).
Furthennore, payments on current loans and limits on future lending henceforth
affect development in the less developed countries. As interest rates increased and exports
stagnated if not declined, the cost of servicing debt increased from 27.1 percent ofexport
revenues to 38.8 percent from 1980 to 1982 (IMF, 1990). Therefore, a large amount of
export revenues must go to interest payments rather than to financing development at the
same time that less credit is available to finance these activities. To make matters even
worse, the Third World's share of global trade has declined during the period of the debt
crisis as mentioned elsewhere in this analysis. Meanwhile, to increase their foreign
exchange reserves, debtor countries must reduce imports. This in reality, affects the
industries in advanced capitalist economies, which depend heavily on these markets. For
instance, the United States balance of trade with Latin America changed from a surplus of
$2 billion in 1980 to a deficit of$13 billion by 1986 (UNCTAD, 1988, pp. 60-66). With this
situation, money that could have been used to build factories and provide employment is
now sent abroad. For this reason, the problem of unemployment and underemployment will
be compounded in the LDCs.
Also, economic crises have created essential political crises for the fragile
democracies that exist in some African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Reaction to
high rates of inflation, economic stagnation, unemployment, poor standard of living, and the
adoption of austerity measures has ranged from rioting to the defeat of incumbent parties,
sometimes replacing moderate with more extremist parties (Klare & Thomas, 1994).
Specifically, there have been over twenty violent protests in recent years against the austerity
measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund, with over 3,000 people dead in those
protests (Feinberg, 1987, pp. 6-8). The most recent occurred in Venezuela, where more than
300 people were killed. However, the protests in Venezuela, the election of the Peronist
party in Argentina, the military takeover of the democratically elected president in Nigeria,
and the election of a right-wing government in El Salvador have all raised serious concerns
about the future ofdemocracy in these areas. Political instability may make it more difficult
for democratic governments to survive, particularly in Africa and Latin America, and may
result in the creation of authoritarian governments. In a number of countries, nationalist
movements on both the left and the right have seen increases in their strength as a result of
the debt problem. In response to instability, direct foreign investment has decreased, hence
worsening the economic conditions. Moreover, popular pressures may lead to regimes
radically hostile to market economies, hence establishing the condition of dramatic
confrontations between debtor nations and the external institutions that establish the tenns
for debt rescheduling.
The last cost of the debt crisis has been one experienced by the advanced capitalist
states, especially by the United States. Increasing poverty in the less developed countries
results in a decrease of economic growth or development in the advanced industrialized
market economies. The less developed countries have been forced to undergo a series of
austerity measures, which include a dramatic fall in imports in order to accelerate the foreign
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exchange revenues needed to pay back their debts. The decrease in the average annual
growth rate for imports of the seventeen most heavily indebted nations is very serious: the
average annual growth rate for these nations in 1965-1980 was 6.4 percent. In 1980-1987,
that figure had declinedto minus 6 percent, for a total shift of minus 12.3 percent (Hastedt
& Knickrehm, 1991). Another major estimate is that the seventeen most heavily indebted
countries reduced their imports from the advanced industrialized countries by $73 billion
from 1981-1986 (Kibourn, 1989). In this particular situation, the United States has been
seriously affected by this major decline in imports because most of its exports to the LDCs
have, historically, gone to the Latin American countries which are most seriously affected
by the debt crisis. In line of this argument, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) argues that:
Because of this import compression by the highly-indebted developing
countries, United States exports to them actually declined by about $10
billion between 1980 and 1986...As a result, the United States recorded
a negative swing in its trade balance of about $12 billion between 1980
and 1986; the corresponding negative swings for the other developed
market economy countries were much smaller: about $3 billion for Japan,
$2.4 billion for the Federal Republic of Germany and $1.6 billion for the
other EEC countries (qouted in Klare & Thomas, 1994, p. 345).
These declines mainly aggravated if not compounded an already bad trade
condition for the United States. The absolute declines were really large; and if one
extrapolates losses from an expected rise for export growth based on current history, the
declines are essential. For one thing, Richard Feinberg translated the export loss to the
United States in terms of lost jobs when he testified before the U.S. Senate: " ... roughly
930,000 jobs would have been created if the growth trend (of United States export to the
LDCs) of the 1970s had continued after 1980. For this reason, he concluded that nearly 1.6
million United States jobs have been lost due largely to recession in the less developed
countries of the South (Fuerbringre, 1992, p. AI). Feinberg finally argues that it is also in
the interests of the advanced industrialized capitalist nations to seek an equitable remedy or
alternative solution to the debt crisis. According to Feinberg, nobody's long term interests
are served by the increasing impoverishment of millions of people. The stability and
financial health of the developed countries depend significantly on debt resolution terms that
permit, improve, and foster economic growth and development of the less developed
countries.
SOLUTIONS TO THE DEBT CRISIS
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has taken on a strong role in the management of the
debt crisis. The heavily indebted nations have had to approach the International Monetary
89
20
African Social Science Review, Vol. 1 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/assr/vol1/iss1/6
African Social Science Review
Fund for financial assistance. In this case, the Fund first assesses the economic condition
of the borrowing nations, works out standby arrangement loan, and monitors the country's
economic measures to ensure that it adheres to the conditions ofthe loan. Private institutions
and international financial establishments mainly perceive IMF approval as an indication
that the debtor nation is attempting to address its economic crisis and is hence worthy of
additional financial assistance. Therefore, in order to renegotiate loans with a private
financial establishment, the debtor country must agree to the Fund's macroeconomic
stabilization measures such as trade liberalization, currency devaluation, and other austerity
measures. However, the macroeconomic stabilization policy, which generally calls for
devaluation of currency and austerity programs to regulate inflation, is politically sensitive
and places an essential burden on the poorer population in the debtor countries. Currently
the IMF has indicated greater flexibility in the economic programs that it has negotiated with
the LDCs. These conditionalities were discussed earlier in this analysis.
THE BAKER PLAN AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION TO THE DEBT CRISIS
Currently, a number of proposals have been put forward for managing the debt problem.
The Baker plan, proposed in 1985, was designed to encourage renewed lending to support
economic growth in the debtor nations (Hastedt & Knickrehm, 1991). The Baker Plan
advocated a three-way agreement among debtors, creditor states, and private creditors. In
the first instance, the debtor states would open their economies to trade and multinational
investment, and implement market-oriented measures. In addition, the creditor countries
would stimulate their own economies and make them accessible to debtor exports and
encourage the role of the World Bank in lending to the debtor states. The private financial
establishments would loan an additional $20 billion to the debtor countries to accelerate
policy changes and to foster economic growth and development. These proposals further
included (i) debt-equity swaps, in which businesses or properties in the debtor nation are
purchased at a discount by the financial establishments as partial repayment; (ii) debt-for-
debt swaps, where bonds are offered at discounted repayments; (iii) exit bonds, which are
long term bonds rendered importantly as take-it-or-Ieave-it offers to creditors who have no
further interest in investing and wish to cut their losses; or (iv) cash buy-backs, where the
debtor nation simply purchases back its loan at a deep discount (Klare & Thomas, 1994, pp.
350-353).
Majority of these proposals, particularly the debt-for-nature swaps, where the
debtor nation promises to protect the environment in return for purchases of the debt by
outside groups, are creative and could have significant implication. Accordingly, the then
Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker, argues that by providing a number of different
options, repayment can be tailored to the particular circumstances of a nation, thus easing
the burden. Critical to the success of the menu approach is the assumption that nations will
eventually grow out of their debt (Ibid.). This plan was perceived as essential because it
marked a true recognition on the part of the United States that the debt crisis was long-term
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and because it did not depend entirely on LDCs' efforts to foster their own economic and
political condition (Ibid.). The policy failed because the fmancial institutions were reluctant
to make new loans. Secondly, this approach also assumes the repayment ofdebts on terms
that are importantly dictated by the creditor nations. Therefore, no lender is obligated to
accept any of these propositions. Again, the opportunities for swaps and buy backs are
limited. There are, after all, a relatively small number of investment opportunities in poorer
nations, and the debt problem itself has also limited those possibilities. Some critics further
argued that, even if it had succeeded, it would only create more debt than many would have
anticipated.
THE BRADY PLAN: A DEBT REDUCTION INITIATIVE
The Brady proposals have to do with debt reduction, and these only became a real possibility
in spring of 1989 with the announcement ofa new policy, named the Brady Plan, after U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady. The Brady Plan specifically called for a total
reduction of about 20 percent of international debt, with the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank providing guarantees for the repayment ~f the other remaining 80
percent of the debt (Klare & Thomas, pp. 350-353). In this particular circumstance, banks
were asked to reduce voluntarily principal or interest charges on loans to developing
countries. Debt would be reduced through such mechanisms as buy backs, conversions of
debt into bonds at lower principal or interest, or debt equity swaps. Since then, Mexico,
Brazil, Morocco, the Philippines, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Venezuela had reached
agreements concerning their debts under the negotiations of the Brady initiative (Ibid.).
This proposal recognizes that problems are to be approached on a case-by-case
basis. To qualify for relief under the Brady Plan, a country must agree to implement
macroeconomic stabilization measures to encourage domestic savings, trade liberalization,
direct foreign investment, and the like. This proposal has been praised for addressing the
need to reduce the debt burden of less developed countries but the plan clearly did not go
far enough in solving the debt problem. The Brady Plan has been criticized for offering too
little relief. Loans would be reduced by about 70 billion over three years. Furthermore,
critics have believed that, if economic conditions worsen and nations are unable to make
their payments, the financial establishments will tum to the multilateral lending institutions,
that is, the IMF and the World Bank, which then must make good on their promise to
guarantee the payments. The proposal is further criticized because it applies only to those
less developed countries that are willing to implement politically unpopular and/or sensitive
austerity programs. Also, in marketterms, less developed countries' debt is already selling
on the secondary market at approximately thirty-five cents to the dollar (Klare & Thomas,
1994).
To put it differently, debt reduction had already occurred in the market place, and
only a proposal that incorporates reduction must take this into consideration. There are some
critical concerns with debt reduction. Debt reduction could minimize the incentive for
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debtor countries to make economic changes that could lead to greater efficiency. Again, it
could establish a precedent that would have the effect of reducing, or even eliminating, the
possibility or chance for any future bank lending for economic development programs.
Also, debt reduction could have the effect of saddling multilateral lending institutions, like
the Wodd Bank, with serious financial burden, thus vitiating their future efficiency and/or
effectiveness.
Meanwhile, these concerns are in reality genuine. Counterpoised to these
possibilities, however, is the stark reality of hundreds of millions of people living in
desperate situations with no hope of relief in the near future (Klare & Thomas, 1994).
According to Clare and Thomas, any proposal for reducing the debt burden, must therefore,
try to incorporate a number of legitimate, but competing, concerns of varying significance.
These two scholars further argue that, the repayment of the debt itself has ceased to be the
main issue. Private financial establishments seriously have an interest in the repayment of
the debt and, to the extent possible, these interests must be accommodated. They also argue
that the security of the global banking system is no longer at risk and as such legitimate
public concern can no longer dictate possible actions. The primary concerns according to
these scholars are: the re-establishment of economic growth in the highly indebted nations,
the effective and meaningful distribution of that growth into all sectors of their economies,
and their reintegration into the global economic system. It is only after sustained economic
growth returns to the highly indebted nations that the global community can begin to
determine manageable rates and methods of debt repayment (Klare & Thomas, 1994).
At this point, however, the International Monetary Fund must basically reexamine
its policy measures with regard to austerity. Programs such as structural adjustment or
economic stabilization policies may be appropriate for the original purpose of the IMF - to
help countries suffering temporary difficulties in maintaining currency value because of
transient balance of payments imbalances. These macroeconomic stabilization policies or
structural adjustment measures are profoundly counterproductive in current circumstances
and, in fact, are guided by a wildly inappropriate perspective. For example, the inflows of
capital to the IMF from the highly indebted states were more than a gross embarrassment
(Ibid.). These were conclusive evidence of the IMF's misunderstanding of the causes of the
debt crisis in the first instance. The IMF must shift its theoretical orientation and analytical
perspective to more creative or appropriate ways of stabilizing or depressing interest rates
rather than increasing them, or ways to prevent capital flight from the LDCs, or support any
specific issues that would foster growth and development in the LDCs.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, therefore, there are genuine issues of responsibility that according to Klare
and Thomas (1994), deserve to be made explicit. The debt crisis is only a symptom of a
global economic system that allows growing and abysmal poverty as a normal condition.
This need not, and should not, be the case. The advanced industrialized states have a
92 23
Anunobi and Ukpong: The Political Economy of International Debt and Third World Devel
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2000
Political Economy ofInternational Debt and Third World Development
responsibility to establish conditions whereby the less developed countries can interact more
productively or effectively in global economic operations. The most effective, if not
essential, contribution to this end might be in the area of reducing trade barriers on the
commodities ofthe less developed countries. The less developed countries will make sure
that money received from international fmancial institutions or private banks are purely and
efficiently utilized for economic growth and development.
Moreover, the obscene personal profits accumulated by such Third World leaders
as Mobutu of Congo (Brazzaville) and Marcos of the Philippines should not be encouraged
and/or fostered by the strategic interests of the industrialized capitalist countries. The
international financial institutions and banks should realize that their single-minded pursuit
of profits almost led them to the brink of bankruptcy. The most important lesson to be
learned from this experience is that for economic growth to be sustained, close attention
must be paid to the mutual interests of all parties involved.
Most importantly, the debt crisis underlines the tremendous interdependence and
political fragility of the global economic and financial system. It has further demonstrated
that not only were Third World economies terribly vulnerable to I or 2 percentage point
increases in the United States interest rates but, perhaps more importantly, developed
countries would in reality be harmed by the economic failures and/or public policies of key
developing countries. While many developing nations can be held at least partially
responsible for the massive accumulation ofdebt, the adverse economic conditions that face
them are often outside of their control. In reality, this adverse economic climate was, in part,
compounded by the industrialized countries' economic stabilization measures which led to
soaring interest rates, worldwide economic recession, and the resulting decrease in demand
for developing nations' exports.
In sum, the burden of the international debt crisis must be shared by all. Several
developing countries may have to undergo a period of difficult adjustment. By the same
token, advanced industrialized countries will have to relax restrictive monetary policies and
encourage imports. In addition, some forms of debt relief programs (for instance, making
interest payments in local currencies or putting a "cap" on real interest rates) will be
necessary. International financial establishments, particularly the IMP and World Bank, will
be required to provide sufficient fmancialliquidity until the economic condition changes in
developing nations allow them to make the necessary adjustments without sacrificing
growth and equity.
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